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Foreword 
As it is 20 years since the Scottish Parliament was 
established, it is an opportune moment to reflect 
on what has changed in our economy over that 
period and to look forward to what may change in 
the next 20 years. 
In many respects, the past 20 years has been a 
game of two halves, with the first half seeing the 
economy performing strongly and the second 
seeing a major downturn, starting with the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and followed by further 
negative impacts such as the downturn in the oil 
price. 
While Scotland’s economy has recovered, it has 
been a very gradual recovery. There have been 
strong points, for example, with employment 
exceeding expectations and reaching record 
levels.  However, we should all hope that the next 
20 years are more akin to the first half of the last 
20 than the second.  
When we look forward to the next 20 years, the 
challenges ahead may seem quite daunting when 
we consider issues such as Brexit, the possibility 
of Indyref2, the 4th industrial revolution, climate 
change, an ageing population, and the rise in geo-
political tension, trade wars and tariffs.
What will pan out is obviously uncertain however 
there is every likelihood of much more and much 
faster change. As Justin Trudeau, Canada’s prime 
minister, told the World Economic Forum in 2018: 
“The pace of change has never been this fast, yet 
it will never be this slow again.”
While we will continue to face an environment of 
ongoing uncertainty, it is important that we do not 
lose sight of the longer-term trends that should 
provide a boost to the economy. Change creates 
opportunities and it is imperative that we seek to 
identify those future opportunities that will allow 
the country to continue to grow and ensure its 
future prosperity. 
Scotland needs to be able to adapt to the 
challenges it faces at pace and be to bolder. 
Trends such as the 4th industrial revolution and 
climate change will be disruptive but they will also 
encourage investment and innovation. 
In Scotland, Fintech is one sector that is leading 
the way. Changes in consumer demand, evolving 
technologies and regulatory developments have 
seen the financial services (FS) sector embrace 
new technologies and ensure it possesses a 
socially aware culture underpinned by financial 
inclusion and education.  Scotland in many ways 
is unique in containing all of the elements in close 
proximity to fuel the growth of this sector and 
champion a vibrant ecosystem.  As a firm, we have 
been incredibly proud to support Fintech Scotland 
on leading the charge to seize this opportunity.
Over the next 10 to 15 years, our FS sector will 
evolve and adapt to support the next generation 
of skills required to embrace this opportunity.  
Recognising that an alchemy of technical skills 
with social understanding will be key.  The 
rounded FS professional of the future will blend 
the data scientist and the anthropologist – a 
critical mix to not only understand how to design 
and build new services, but also importantly 
understand the social surroundings and context in 
which they sit.
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institute’s economic forecasts.
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While climate change concerns mean that there is 
rightly a real focus on energy transition, we cannot 
lose sight of the fact the UK will still be dependent 
on oil and gas as the country moves towards a 
zero-carbon future.   
Anchoring experienced leaders with new talent 
who will use technology, such as digital and 
artificial intelligence, to ensure the energy 
industry is fit for the future is crucial. Similarly, 
ensuring the supply chain is able to survive 
and thrive is vital as we develop future energy 
resources.   
For most businesses, whatever the sector, 
the projected decline in the working age 
population will be another challenge. Increasing 
opportunities for agile working and encouraging 
older people to remain in the workforce will be 
fundamental.
By way of example, in 2015, Deloitte established 
an industry-first Return to Work programme for 
people returning from a career break of at least 
two years. It was specifically designed to refresh 
knowledge and skills to help candidates transition 
back to the workplace with confidence and has 
resulted in almost 50 people successfully joining 
the firm.  More, similar, initiatives are likely to be 
required to meet our labour needs.
The scale of change we will likely experience 
over the next 20 years will undoubtedly create 
significant opportunities and Scotland needs 
to position itself to take advantage of these.  
However, as the Commentary notes, if Scotland is 
to do this, everyone will need to be bolder than in 
the past 20 years.
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Brexit uncertainty continues to cast a shadow over 
the UK and Scottish economies.
Three years on from the referendum and there is 
little clarity surrounding the nature or timing of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
This has had two consequences. 
Firstly, there is mounting evidence that the 
uncertainty is impacting upon investment. Business 
investment in the UK declined throughout 2018, 
with recent surveys here in Scotland suggesting 
the start of 2019 has been just as challenging.
Secondly, activity in the overall economy has 
been noticeably more volatile than usual.  During 
Q1, and as businesses implemented contingency 
plans, growth in the Scottish economy picked-up 
to 0.5%. This was the fastest rate of growth in 2 
years.  
But the boost is likely to be temporary. Indeed, we 
have already seen the UK economy shrink in both 
March and April as the effects of stockpiling are 
unwound. 
One bright spot has been in international exports 
with the latest data showing strong growth in 
2018. Scotland’s labour market also continues to 
perform strongly – at least on headline measures 
of activity – with a record number of people in 
work. However, lying behind these data are more 
subtle trends such as weak long-term productivity, 
squeezed household incomes and earnings 
lagging the UK.
The need for frankness about what the data is 
telling us is all the more crucial given the policy 
challenges – and opportunities – that now face the 
Scottish Government. 
Last month’s announcement from the Scottish 
Fiscal Commission of the potential for ‘income 
Summary
tax reconciliations’ totalling over £1bn laid bare 
the risks now embedded in Scotland’s new Fiscal 
Framework. 
The lack of analysis so far from the government 
to explain the causes of the gap or how they will 
respond has been surprising. 
As in our last Commentary, we have developed a 
series of scenarios to illustrate how the Scottish 
economy may fare over the next three years. As 
with all such scenarios, the exact decimal point 
estimates are less important than the overall scale 
and direction of travel.  
In our central forecast, we continue to assume 
an orderly departure from the EU, although 
uncertainty continues to impact on growth for the 
foreseeable future. We have revised up slightly our 
forecast for 2019 to 1.2% but kept 2020 and 2021 
unchanged at 1.4% and 1.5%. 
A positive scenario, where some form of deal is 
reached and uncertainty is reduced, could see 
growth surprisingly on the upside. ‘No deal’ 
outcomes – even where there is some coordinate 
policy response – will have a negative impact on 
Scotland’s growth prospects.  
All of this comes at a time when we mark  the 20th 
anniversary of devolution. In this commentary, we 
look at how the Scottish economy has changed 
over that period. 
With Brexit, the potential for IndyRef2, not to 
mention an ageing population, climate change and 
the 4th industrial revolution all on the cards, the 
next 20 years are likely to require a boldness in 
policy making far beyond what we have seen so far 
in the devolution era.    
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At a glance
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Production 1.2% 1.5% 1.4%
Construction 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Services 1.3% 1.5% 1.6%
FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2019 – 2021, central 
forecast based on orderly departure
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FAI forecast Scottish labour market indicators - central forecast 
based on orderly departure
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%) Year Change Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 75.9 ▲ 3.3 ▼
England 76.3 ▲ 4.0 ▼
Wales 75.5 ▲ 4.5 ▲
N. Ireland 71.3 ▲ 3.2 ▼
UK 76.1 - 3.8 ▼
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate (%) 75.3 75.1 74.7
Unemployment Rate (%) 3.7 4.0 4.2
Central forecast
Due to uncertainty around possible Brexit outcomes, 
we have developed a range of different scenarios. More 
information can be found in the ‘Our forecasts’ section.
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Outlook and Appraisal
The Scottish economy remains relatively resilient despite the ongoing Brexit uncertainty. But recent data 
has been skewed by firms implementing Brexit contingency plans. The risks to the outlook remain high. 
Chart 1: Scottish growth (since 2014) – year and quarter %
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Chart 2: GDP average annual growth rate (over 10 years)
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Chart 3: Income tax ‘net tax’ position at successful fiscal events
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Introduction
We still await clarity over the UK’s departure from 
the EU, 3 years since the referendum. 
Despite this, growth in the first 3 months of 2019 
was +0.5% - the fastest growth in 2 years. Chart 1.
But much of this appears to stem from businesses 
stockpiling for a potential ‘no deal’. As more up-to-
date UK data has shown, this is likely to unwind in 
time. 
Growth in the services sector – less likely to be 
impacted by stockpiling – slowed to just 0.1%. 
International exports have performed strongly over 
the last year, with strong growth in a number of 
sectors.
Much of the Brexit debate has focussed upon the 
possible impacts on trade patterns. 
But arguably a bigger challenge is what it might 
mean for Scotland’s population. A significant 
proportion of Scotland’s long-term growth gap with 
the rUK can be explained by population growth. 
Should Brexit make in-migration more difficult – or 
less attractive – then this could have implications 
for key sectors and the economy at large. Chart 2.
That being said, not all of the current risks facing 
Scotland relate to population. The latest information 
from the SFC and the OBR suggests a gap is opening 
up between Scottish and rUK earnings requiring an 
‘income tax reconciliation’ of around £1bn. 
Whilst Scottish income taxpayers are paying some 
£500m more in income tax than they would pay 
under UK policy, this has been completely offset by 
weaker performance in the Scottish tax base.  
Chart 3.
To call this a ‘black hole’ is an over-dramatization. 
But the Scottish Government will have to find money 
to pay for these reconciliations. 
There are serious issues here and they shouldn’t be 
overly political. MSPs need to work through these 
challenges and better scrutinise government policy.
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Table 1: OECD growth rates (%), 2017 & 2018 (outturn) to 2020
2017 2018 2019 2020
UK 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.0
US 2.2 2.9 2.8 2.3
Japan 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
Canada 3.0 1.8 1.3 2.0
Germany 2.5 1.5 0.7 1.2
France 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.3
Italy 1.8 0.7 0.0 0.6
Euro Area 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.4
World Growth 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.4
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
Chart 4: World economic growth, 2011 - 2020
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Chart 5: Geopolitical Risk Index, 2010 - 2019
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The global economy
In the past few commentaries, we have highlighted 
a general weakening in global economic prospects 
following over two years of robust growth. 
It is now clear that the policy uncertainties that have 
built over the past year are finally starting to impact 
on real indicators. Table 1 
The latest assessments of both the IMF and OECD 
suggest that growth will slow to around 3.2% this 
year before edging up to 3.4% in 2020 - below the 
growth rates seen over the past three decades and 
in 2017-18. Chart 4.
A slowdown was always on the cards. The global 
economy had been growing above trend for a 
number of years, and for the first time since the 
financial crisis.  At the same time, a number of 
countries – most notably the US – had been adding 
further stimulus through increased government 
spending and tax cuts. 
But the easing to a more balanced growth trend has 
been accompanied by more worrying signs. 
Rising geo-political tensions (in the Middle East) 
and heightened domestic policy uncertainties – of 
which Brexit is one – have not helped. Chart 5.
The series of new tariffs and retaliatory counter-
measures introduced in 2018 by a number of 
countries are having a negative effect on output.  
Trade has slowed sharply. With Europe particularly 
impacted. Chart 6 and 7.
Chart 6: World trade growth, Q1 2016 - Q1 2019
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Chart 7: Euro area export volume growth, Jan 2016 - Jan 2019
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Chart 8: Impact of higher US-China tariffs on the level of GDP & 
trade by 2021-22
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Chart 9: Contribution to G20 fixed investment growth, 2013 - 
2018
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Of course, a key driver of this outcome has been the 
escalation of trade tensions between the US and 
China. 
The announcement in May of a further round of 
tariffs by the Trump administration on Chinese 
goods worth around $200bn – on top of those 
announced last year – led to swift retaliatory action. 
The OECD estimates that such measures could 
reduce US and Chinese GDP by up to 0.3% by 
2022 (on top of a similar reduction for the 2018 
restrictions).
The bigger risk is for such actions to lead to a wider 
weakening in sentiment and further ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ policies. Chart 8.
Talk of a recession remains wide of the mark, but it 
is clear that the risks are high. 
As with any period of uncertainty, investment is the 
first element to take a hit. 
Investment growth in the G20 has halved, from 
around 5% in 2017 to 2½ per cent in 2018. Chart 9.
In such a climate it is no surprise that oil prices have 
been volatile.  Chart 10.
Despite this, confidence in Scotland’s oil and gas 
industry remains relatively healthy. 
Our latest survey of the sector continues to show 
high levels of optimism. Whilst there has been a 
slight easing in the number of firms reporting an 
uplift in expected activity in the months ahead, most 
were reporting steady growth. Investment remains 
on the rise. 
Chart 10: Price of oil, Jan 2013 - Jun 2019, US $/BBL
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Chart 11: UK GDP growth, Q3 2017 - Q1 2019
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Chart 12: IoM quarter-on-quarter growth, seasonally adjusted, 
UK, Q1 2000 - Q1 2019
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Table 2: UK economic Growth, 2017 - 2019
2017 2018 2019
GDP 0.2% -0.1% -0.4%
Services 0.2% -0.1% 0.0%
Production 0.6% 0.7% -2.7%
Manufacturing 1.0% 0.9% -3.9%
Construction 0.5% -1.9% -0.4%
Agriculture -0.6% -0.1% 0.0%
Source: ONS 
The UK economy
We remain in uncharted territory, with each and 
every data release – both official and unofficial – 
poured over to try to better understand both the 
possible impacts of Brexit and the underlying health 
of the UK economy.  
As we highlighted shortly after the EU Referendum 
in 2016, the economic data was likely to be volatile 
until further clarity in the UK’s position post-Brexit 
was forthcoming. 
Three years on, this remains as true today as back 
then. 
The most recent calendar quarter we have data for 
– the period January to March 2019 – shows robust 
growth of 0.5%. Chart 11. 
However, much of this growth appears to have been 
due to firms stockpiling in case of a ‘no deal’ Brexit 
on 29th March. Chart 12.
This boost was only ever going to be temporary, 
and indeed recent monthly data shows that the UK 
economy actually shrank in both March and April of 
this year. 
Stockpiling is most obvious in manufacturing. 
Manufacturing output increased by 1.0% in February 
and by a further 0.9% in March; before falling back 
by nearly 4% in April. Table 2.
This volatility harms businesses in a number of 
ways. Firstly, it has an impact upon cash flow and 
company balances. Secondly, it diverts attention 
and resources from more productive practices, such 
as seeking opportunities for business expansion 
and investment.
In such times, it is more important to focus upon 
longer-term trends to get a broader picture of 
performance. 
There is no doubting that the UK economy is weaker 
than many people thought it would be by this time 
back in 2016. Chart 13. Compared to the Bank of 
England forecast back then, output is currently more 
than £30bn less than predicted.
With this uncertainty and weaker outlook, 
expectations for how long monetary policy will 
remain at its highly expansive state have been 
extended. Chart 14.
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Chart 13: Post-referendum performance relative to pre- and 
post-referendum growth forecasts, Q2 2015 - Q3 2019
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Chart 14: International forward interest rates, 2016 - 2022
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Chart 15: Contributions to CPI inflation, UK, 2014 - 2019
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Even so, inflation in the UK continues to fall – albeit 
there has been a modest rise in recent months. CPI 
inflation is expected to come in below target through 
the remainder of 2019. Chart 15.
One clear cost of the impasse over Brexit has been 
the impact upon investment in the UK economy. 
The UK had the slowest growth in Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation of any G7 country in 2018.  Chart 16
A key driver of this has been weak business 
investment. 
Business investment fell by 0.9% in the final three 
months of 2018 - the fourth consecutive quarter-
on-quarter fall. This is the first time business 
investment has fallen for such a sustained period of 
time since the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
Overall, the decline in investment by business 
sector has been relatively broad based. Chart 17.
Such a decline is a concern given that we know 
that a key reason why the UK’s productivity lags 
behind the best performing countries in the world 
is because of low levels of investment – by both the 
private and public sectors. 
This comes at a time when many of the determinants 
of business investment have remained supportive. 
The cost of finance is low relative to historical 
norms, rates of return on capital are robust, the 
labour market remains tight and survey measures 
suggest that firms are operating with limited spare 
capacity. 
Chart 16: Gross fixed capital formation growth, UK, Q1 2018 - 
Q4 2018
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Chart 17: Contributions to four-quarter growth in business 
investment by asset, UK, Q1 2013 - Q4 2018
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Chart 18: Average annual growth in capital expenditure by 
degree of concern about Brexit, Q1 2017 - Q1 2019
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Chart 19: Employment rate, UK, 1861 - 2018
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But uncertainty is clearly having an impact. 
According to the latest Deloitte CFO Survey, 54% 
of CFOs rate the level of uncertainty as high or very 
high, compared to just 25% in 2018 Q2. 
The Bank of England’s own research estimates 
that investment may be between 6%–14% lower 
than it would have been in the absence of Brexit 
uncertainties. 
At first glance, the one bright spot in the UK 
economy remains the labour market. 
The UK employment rate was estimated at 76.1%, 
higher than for a year earlier (75.6%) and the joint- 
highest figure on record. 
The UK unemployment rate is now just 3.8%; it has 
not been lower since October to December 1974.
This ‘tight’ labour market has – at long-last – started 
to lead to improvements in real take-home earnings 
for many workers. Over the year to March 2019, 
regular pay was estimated to have increased by 
3.3% in nominal terms and by 1.5% in real terms
It is possible to go even further back and put today’s 
labour market figures in context. 
A new project by the Bank of England - The 
Millennium of Macroeconomic Data – aims to put 
together various datasets to provide an illustrative 
measure of economic variables going back to the 
mid-19th century. Whilst exact point estimates have 
to be used with caution – and clearly the economies 
of 2018 and 1918 differ significantly from each 
other in so many ways. Chart 19. 
One of the key drivers for higher employment and 
participation rates has been changes in female 
participation.  
Industrial changes, incremental improvements 
in legislation and shifting social attitudes have 
all contributed to a significant increase in female 
participation in the labour market. Over the 10 year 
period, 1951 to 1960 there were an estimated 6.91 
million women ‘economically active’. Between 2011 
and 2018 the figure was 15.25 million.  
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Chart 20: Decomposition of the change in employment, UK, Jan 
2015 - Feb 2019
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Chart 21: Labour productivity growth, 1998 - 2017
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Chart 22: Multi-factor productivity growth, 1998 - 2017
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Immediately after the financial crisis there were 
fears that much of the ‘robustness’ in the labour 
market data might be camouflaging a rise in 
involuntary part-time work and self-employment.
But in recent times, whilst these two elements 
continue to grow, much of the growth in the 
headline employment figures is stemming from full-
time jobs. Chart 20. 
Alongside the rise in employment, the participation 
rate has been increasing in recent times. Much of 
this increase was accounted for by those aged 50 
and over. 
Of course, the strength in employment growth 
alongside soft demand growth has therefore – once 
again - been associated with sluggish productivity 
growth.
Whilst weak productivity growth has been a feature 
of most advanced economies since the financial 
crisis, it appears to be particularly pronounced in 
the UK (with only Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico and 
Italy) having weaker productivity performance this 
last decade. Charts 21 and 22. 
UK economic outlook
Most near-term indicators continue to point to weak 
growth in the overall UK economy. 
As highlighted above, growth figures – and other 
metrics of economic activity – are likely to be 
volatile.
Following the strong growth of 0.5% in Q1 2019, 
most economists are predicting much weaker growth 
of 0.2% in Q2 2019. Early indications are not great, 
with a huge reduction in vehicle production in April 
helping the UK economy to contract in that month.  
Away from the official data, most measures of 
confidence and current activity levels remain – at 
best – subdued, and in most cases, negative. 
The CBI’s Business Optimism Indicator was -13 in 
Q2 2019. Chart 23. This was the 5th month in a row 
that the indicator was negative. The proportion of 
firms citing political/economic conditions abroad as 
a factor likely to limit export orders in the next three 
months was at its highest since January 1983.
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Chart 23: CBI measures of confidence, Q1 2015 - Q1 2019
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Chart 24: Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) for the UK, Jan 2016 
- May 2019
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Chart 25: Deloitte CFO survey -v % of CFOs who rate external 
uncertainty facing their business as high or very high
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The most recent purchasing managers’ surveys for 
manufacturing, construction and services also point 
to activity being fairly stagnant. Chart 24.
Two of them, for manufacturing and construction, 
showed a drop below the key 50 level, pointing 
to falling output. The other, for services picked up 
marginally to 51, but this is consistent with barely 
any growth. 
As we highlighted in our last commentary however, 
we need to be slightly careful when interpreting 
surveys at the current time. 
It is possible that in times of uncertainty, the link 
between surveys – particularly around measure of 
‘confidence’ – and actual day-to-day activity is not 
perfect. 
However, it would be wrong to completely dismiss 
them, particularly when there is such consistency 
across the board. What we can definitely conclude is 
that uncertainty is high. Chart 25.
Households seem to be particularly pessimistic 
about the near-term outlook. Chart 26. 
According to the Bank of England, household 
expectations about the economic outlook are at 
their lowest since just after the financial crisis. 
The question is where do we go from here.
The Bank of England and Office for Budget 
Responsibility have attached considerably large 
error bands around their projections for the UK 
economy over the next few years. Chart 27.
Chart 26: Indicators of consumer confidence, UK, Jan 2010 - Apr 
2019
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Chart 27: GDP growth, 2010 - 2023
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
C
ha
ng
e 
o
n 
a 
ye
ar
 e
ar
lie
r (
%
)
March forecast
October forecast
Source: OBR
Chart 28: Nowcasts of UK regional growth, year to Q1 2019
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
R
ea
l G
VA
 g
ro
w
th
 (
%
)
Source: ESCoE
Chart 29: Expectations for the impact on business of Brexit
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Variations across the UK are likely to continue. 
Scotland is projected to be one of the better 
performing parts of the UK - once again - in a 
sluggish UK economy. Chart 28.
Most forecasters predict that the UK economy will 
continue to grow this year, but to remain subdued.
Of course, crucial to this will be what happens 
politically over the summer months, following the 
election of a new Prime Minister. 
Many of the businesses that we work with breathed 
a huge sigh of a relief when the prospect of a ‘no 
deal’ Brexit in March was lifted. 
But it did not come without cost. Many companies 
are now running under higher cash-flow and 
resource constraints as they try to adjust their 
business models to cope with additional stock-
piling and contingency planning. 
The prospects of a ‘no deal’ Brexit remains a risk.
As we have argued on many occasions, a no-deal 
Brexit would represent a significant shock to the UK 
economy. 
A ‘managed’ no-deal may seem attractive to 
some – and depending upon the nature of how 
it is managed, some of the worst impacts may be 
reduced. But it would still act as a serious hit to 
growth and prospects on the short term.
Amongst the business community, there appears 
however, to be an increase in investment to 
prepare for a ‘no deal’ scenario. In a recent 
survey for the Bank of England, three quarters of 
respondents reported that they had done some 
form of contingency planning, with two thirds of 
respondents feeling that they were ready for a ‘no 
deal, no transition’ Brexit. 
As in previous surveys, even those respondents 
who reported being ‘ready’ thought on average that 
output and employment would fall substantially over 
the next year in a ‘no deal, no transition’ scenario. 
In the most recent survey conducted in April, a 
net percentage balance of -28% of firms expected 
output to fall and -17% of firms expected 
employment to shrink if there was no deal and no 
transition. Chart 29.
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
Agriculture
% of  
Economy 2018 Q1 2019
Growth
Construction  ■ This quarter shows relatively strong growth following on from three previous quarters of sustained positive growth. 
 ■ Weak performance during 2018. This is the first positive 
percentage change since 2017 Q4.
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6.1%
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1.2%
 ■ The retail and wholesale sector started 2019 better 
than many expected - particularly given the fragile state 
of household confidence. The persistent troubles for 
traditional retailers are still present however. 
 
 
 
 ■ Accommodation & food services was up on the year 
however, down over 1% during the first quarter of this 
year. Other sectors with falling output were Professional 
Services and Administration & Support. 
 
 
 ■ Steady growth continued into 2019 Q1, creating a strong 
platform for the finance and insurance sector to build 
upon into the remaining 3 quarters. This sector has grown 
by over 2% over the last year, taking it close to pre-crisis 
levels of output.
Production
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Electricity &  
Gas supply
17.2%
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3.5%
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3.2%
5.4% 
 
 
1.8%
2.6%
6.2%
 
-0.4%
 ■ The main contributor to growth for Q1 2019 was the 
manufacturing sector. Within this, two sectors combined 
contribute 0.3% to total GDP growth (0.5%). This was 
likely due to companies ‘stockpiling’ in preparation for 
Brexit.
Key issues/trends
5.9%
1.2%
-0.6%
-2.1%
2.0%
0.9%
 ■ The food and drink sector started 2019 strongly, 
continuing to rise on previous years. Much of this 
growth appears once again to stem from greater exports. 
Scotland’s exports increasingly look set to develop 
strengths not only in whisky, but other exports of Scottish 
food and drink.
 ■ Electricity and gas supply decreased by 0.4%. This was a 
smaller drop than last quarter (2018 Q4 is -4.3%).
3.7%
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Chart 30: Composition of economic growth in Scotland over the 
quarter and over the year
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Chart 31: Manufacturing growth by key sub-sector
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Chart 32: GDP quarterly growth, services, Q1 2019
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The Scottish economy
The latest data shows that the Scottish economy 
grew by 0.5% during the first three months of 2019 
– the fastest growth in two years. 
Despite this, growth over the year remains relatively 
constant at 1.4% (still below Scotland’s long-term 
average growth rate) and marginally behind the UK 
rate.
Underlying the most recent quarterly statistics are 
some interesting trends. 
Annual Growth – as to be expected – driven by the 
performance of the services sector (which makes up 
around 75% of the Scottish economy). Chart 30. 
But over the most recent quarter, however, growth 
was driven by the production sector, and in 
particular, manufacturing.
Manufacturing activity was up 2.6% over the 
quarter. The largest contributions come from the 
food & beverages sector and the refined petroleum 
& pharmaceuticals sector. These two sectors make 
up less than 5% of the economy but generated over 
half of Scotland’s Q1 GDP growth. Chart 31.
The effect of stockpiling on GDP is to boost activity 
in the short-run, but for it to then slip back as 
firms run down their stocks later. We have seen 
this already happen at the UK level. Manufacturing 
output increased by 1.0% in February and by a 
further 0.9% in March. But it fell back by 3.9% in 
April.
Of concern was the very weak performance of the 
services sector which only grew by 0.1%. Key sectors 
such as those tied to accommodation and food, 
transport and wider professional and administrative 
services all slipped back over the three month 
period. Chart 32.
Financial services remained relatively resilient, 
and have been a key strong point for the Scottish 
economy over the last year. Output was up 4.5% on 
the same period in 2018. Growth in food and drink 
manufacturing was also very strong – up 6.2% over 
the quarter. Whilst a large element of this is likely to 
be the effects of stockpiling, there is wider evidence 
to suggest that this sector continues to be one of 
Scotland’s growth markets.
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Chart 33: Scottish exports to UK & RoW, 1998 - 2018
-16,000
-14,000
-12,000
-10,000
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
 -
 2,000
 4,000
 6,000
£ 
M
illi
on
s
Net Exports to UK Net Exports to ROW
Source: Scottish Government 
Table 3: UK labour market, February - April 2019
Employment 
(16-64)
Unemployment  
(16+)
Inactivity 
(16-64)
Scotland 75.9 3.3 21.5
Quarterly 
change
0.6 -0.1 -0.5
Annual 
change
0.8 -1.0 0.0
UK 76.1 3.8 20.8
Quarterly 
change
0.0 -0.1 0.1
Annual 
change
0.5 -0.4 -0.3
Source: ONS,  Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
Chart 34: Scottish employment & unemployment rate 2009 - 
Jan/March 2019
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
Jan-
Mar
2009
Jan-
Mar
2010
Jan-
Mar
2011
Jan-
Mar
2012
Jan-
Mar
2013
Jan-
Mar
2014
Jan-
Mar
2015
Jan-
Mar
2016
Jan-
Mar
2017
Jan-
Mar
2018
Jan-
Mar
2019
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
(%
)
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 (%
)
16 - 64 employment rate (LH axis)
16+ unemployment rate (RH axis)
Source: ONS, LFS
One strong area for growth in Scotland in recent 
times has been in net exports to international 
markets. 
Scotland has traditionally run a positive trade 
balance with the rest of the world, primarily because 
of the strong performance of the whisky sector and 
industries to oil and gas. In recent years, Scotland 
had moved into deficit. But this was turned around 
in 2018, with a trade surplus of £265 million. The 
key driver of this was an 8% growth in international 
exports, double the growth rate of international 
imports. This trend appears to have continued into 
Q1, with the latest HMRC data. Chart 33.
As we discuss below, our more recent business 
survey data suggests that this strong export growth 
may be starting to ease a little. 
Scottish labour market
Scotland’s unemployment rate currently sits at 
3.3%. This is a full percentage point lower than it 
was this time last year, and fractionally above its 
record low set last month. Table 3.
The UK saw its unemployment rate drop to 3.8%, 
falling by 0.4%-points over the past year, and now 
recording its joint lowest rate since 1974.
There have been a number of changes in the 
Scottish and UK labour markets since the global 
financial crisis. Chart 34.
One area where we have seen some notable 
changes is in the age composition of those in 
employment. Chart 35.
Chart 35: Employment changes by age up to January - December 
2018
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Chart 36: Employment changes by type of employment up to 
January - December 2018
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Chart 37: Changes in full-time and part-time employment to 
January - December 2018
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Chart 38: Growth in median pay, 2012 - 2018 and Consumer 
Price Index
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Older workers are much more likely to be in 
employment now than they were earlier in the 
2000s. 
Most of the job growth since 2005 has been in 
employee jobs, with the exception of the increase 
in self-employment in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and the larger increase in 2016. Chart 36.
Another way to look at changes in the labour market 
in Scotland is by looking at changes in the nature 
of work, for example by part-time and full-time 
working. Chart 37.
There is a clear rising trend in the number of workers 
in part-time employment, up over 15% since 2005, 
with a smaller increase in full-time employment of 
nearly 5%. 
For obvious reasons, many people view growth in 
full-time work as a better indicator of labour market 
health than part-time work, however part-time 
work can represent greater labour market flexibility 
for workers and can be valued by workers for that 
reason.
Chart 38 shows growth in median pay in Scotland 
and the UK since 2012. Overlaid on Chart 38 is 
the headline consumer price index measure of 
inflation. Where the red or black bar is above the 
grey line, this indicates that median earnings are 
growing more quickly than inflation, and therefore 
these workers should on average be seeing their 
purchasing power increase.
Chart 39: UK average weekly earnings growth, by public and 
private sector, to March 2019
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Chart 40: Productivity growth (output per hour) to Q4 2018, 
Scotland
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Chart 41: Productivity growth (output per hour) by sector to 
2018, Scotland
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Chart 42: Productivity growth (output per hour) by region of 
Scotland
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More recent data on earnings growth for the UK as 
a whole can be found in the ONS’s Average Weekly 
Earnings survey data. These are shown in Chart 39. 
We can see that pay, in cash terms, grew through 
2018, in line with the ASHE data above, but that in 
more recent times pay growth has started to weaken 
– particularly in the public sector.
Productivity 
Productivity and earnings have a close relationship. 
It is through increases in productivity, how much 
output a worker is able to produce in a given period 
of time (typically per hour), that firms are able to 
afford increases in pay.
Chart 40 shows the path of productivity growth 
in Scotland since 1998. We can see that labour 
productivity growth (output per hour worked) grew 
rapidly at the start of this period, and much more 
slowly after the global financial crisis. This reflects 
the UK-wide ‘productivity puzzle’.
In more recent times, Scottish productivity has 
improved, but this is typically because of a fall in 
hours worked, not because workers are producing 
more output. 
Chart 41 shows similar data, but broken down by 
sector. We can see that manufacturing industries 
have seen rapid productivity growth, both before 
and after the global financial crisis. Other sectors, 
for instance services are barely more productive now 
than a decade ago. 
Within Scotland the location of activity in each 
sector will have implications for local productivity 
growth, and in turn wages. Chart 42 shows data on 
local labour productivity.
We can see that the North Eastern Scotland economy 
saw rapid rises in productivity through to the oil-
price collapse in late 2014. 
Since then labour productivity has dropped 
markedly. Elsewhere most areas have tracked 
Scotland’s relatively muted average productivity 
growth.
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Table 4: Scottish economic Growth, % growth rates, 2018 - 2024
GDP 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Dec 
2018
1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
May 
2019
1.3 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3
Source: Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC)
Chart 43: Forecast comparison, SFC May 2019 Scotland with 
OBR March 2019 UK, GDP and GDP per person growth
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Table 5: Income tax reconciliations
Budget year Outturn 
data 
Budget 
affected
Forecast 
reconciliation 
(£m)
2017-18 Summer 
2019
2020-21 -229
2018-19 Summer 
2020
2021-22 -608
2019-20 Summer 
2021
2022-23 -188
Source: SFC 
Scottish Fiscal Commission
Last month, we had an update from the Scottish 
Fiscal Commission setting out their forecasts for the 
economy and Scotland’s devolved public finances. 
The SFC remains more pessimistic about the outlook 
than we are – with growth of just 0.8% predicted for 
2019. Table 4.
The SFC’s forecasts are also weaker than the OBR 
forecasts for the UK, although the growth forecasts 
for GDP per head are not too dissimilar. Chart 43.
The big story was the substantial reconciliations in 
income tax of around £1bn. Table 5.
Interestingly, this gap appears to stem, not from 
Scottish tax receipts performing weaker than 
forecast, but from rUK receipts doing better. With a 
gap in earnings opening up. Chart 38.
The Smith Commission brought more autonomy and 
accountability to Holyrood with new responsibilities 
over tax and social security. 
But it also brought risks. Parliament was happy to 
trade off these risks for ‘more powers’. 
These risks include -  
 ■ the risk that the Scottish Budget bears the 
cost of any divergence between Scottish 
and rUK tax growth no matter the source, or 
ability of Holyrood to respond; 
 ■ the risk that Scotland has to match rUK tax 
performance with London included in the rUK 
tax take;  
 ■ the risk that the borrowing and reserve 
powers to manage volatility in forecasting 
may be restrictive; 
 ■ the risk that assigning VAT based on a 
sample of a few hundred households might 
not be robust; and
 ■ the risk that the devolution of social security 
powers may be more complex and costly than 
envisaged. 
Whilst the Parliament has spent a lot of time 
debating how to use its new powers, it cannot ignore 
the risks.
The quality of recent debates – and in particular 
the scrutiny of the medium term outlook for the 
Scottish Budget – suggests that many MSPs are yet 
to appreciate the scale of the risks now embedded 
in the new budget process. 
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Table 6: FAI Business Monitor Key Indicators, Q2 2019
Q2 2019 Quarter 
change
Year 
change
FAI Business Activity 
Index (net % balance)
+14% +8 +7
Business activity (net 
% balance)
New business +11% +4 +2
Repeat business +5% +1 +5
Business concerns (%)
Weakening demand - 
important
78% -3 -1
Exchange rates - 
important 
52% -2 0
Investment (net 
balance)
Capital investment -7% 0 0
Leasing -21% -4 +2
Source: FAI Business Monitor 
Chart 44: Business Monitor Activity Index, Q2 1999 - Q2 2019
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Chart 45: Purchasing Manager’s Index, Scotland & UK, Jan 2016 
- May 2019
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Latest Scottish indicators
The most recent indicators of conditions in the 
Scottish economy continue to paint a relatively 
mixed picture. 
Our latest FAI Scottish Business Monitor shows that 
businesses appear to remain relatively resilient to 
the ongoing uncertainty. Table 6.
The net balance for new business was, once again 
positive (+14) jumping by eight points on the 
previous quarter. Chart 44.
However, the net balance for exports slumped to 
its lowest level in 3 years with only 1 in 5 firms 
indicating a rise in export activity. Almost 3 in 10 
reported a fall with half of firms reporting no change 
to export levels. 
The outlook for investment also remains highly 
negative – and continues to flat-line well below its 
long-run average. 
A more downbeat assessment was provided in the 
latest IHS Markit PMI indicator. According to this 
indicator, private sector output in Scotland declined 
in May for the 5th time in 6 months.  
Scotland does not seem to be that different to the 
picture for the UK as a whole. Chart 45. 
Retail sales picked-up in the first quarter of 2019 
after a weak end to 2018. Chart 46. However, wider 
measures of consumer confidence continue to paint 
a bleaker picture.  
Chart 46: Quarterly retail sales growth in Scotland & GB since 
2016
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Chart 47: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index, 
current conditions, Q2 2013 - Q1 2019
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Chart 48: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index 
expectations of the Scottish economy, Q2 2013 - Q1 2019
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Chart 49: GfK consumer confidence index, Jan 2016 - May 2019
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The latest Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment 
indicator slumped to -9.6. Compared to Q4 2018, 
the indicator decreased by 3.8 points, implying that 
sentiment weakened over the quarter. It was also 
the lowest value recorded since the indicator began 
in 2013. Chart 47.
Dragging down the indicator is a particularly strong 
negative sentiment amongst households about the 
outlook for the economy. Chart 48.
A similar picture is evident in the GfK measure 
of consumer confidence. Overall, the series for 
Scotland is more volatile for the UK – which is to 
be expected given that it is based upon a smaller 
sample. But over time, it shows a negative picture, 
and one that appears to be weakening over time. 
Chart 49.
Like the official statistics, the one bright spot 
remains the jobs market. Indicators on activity 
remain positive, suggesting that recruitment 
continues and demand for new employees is on the 
rise. That being said, the outlook does appear to 
have slipped back a little in recent times to levels 
consistent with activity back in 2017. Chart 50.
With inflation falling, the tight labour market should 
start to put upward pressure on wage rates which 
in turn should help boost consumer confidence and 
household spending. 
Chart 50: Employment barometer, March 2007 - May 2019 
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Table 7: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2019 2020 2021
Bank of England 1.3% 1.5% 1.8%
OBR 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%
NIESR 1.4% 1.6% 1.7%
European Commission 1.3% 1.3% -
IMF 1.2% 2.0% 1.6%
Oxford Economics 1.3% 1.6% -
ITEM Club 1.4% 1.5% -
CBI 1.4% 1.6% -
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Chart 51: FAI central forecast and scenarios
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Table 8:  FAI central forecast and scenarios, %, 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Business Investment unlocked 1.3% 1.8% 1.7%
Central Forecast 1.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Attempted “managed” no deal 1.0% -0.7% 1.0%
No deal policy response 1.0% -1.4% 0.9%
No deal no policy response 0.6% -4.2% 1.4%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Our forecasts
Economic forecasting in the midst of this current 
uncertainty continues to be fraught with difficulties.
As a result, all economic forecasts need to be viewed 
with caution. We simply do not know how decisions 
in Westminster or Brussels will pan out. Nor do we 
have any precedent to fall back on to give guidance 
on what the economic impacts might be. 
Moreover, the smoothness, or otherwise, of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU is but one step in the 
process. Negotiations on the terms of the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU have yet to begin in 
earnest. 
In the light of all this, we present a series of 
scenarios for how the Scottish economy may evolve 
over the next three years. Chart 51.
These are not forecasts rather they are different 
potential pathways for consumption, investment 
and trade based on different possible outcomes, 
which we have tried to badge with the different 
labels that are being used in the current debate. 
With this in mind - as with any such scenarios - the 
exact point estimates are less important than the 
overall scale and direction of travel. 
In our central forecast, we assume that the UK now 
makes an orderly departure from the EU at the end 
of October 2019, although uncertainty continues to 
impact on investment and private sector spending 
decisions for some time yet. 
We have left our forecasts for the next 3 years 
broadly unchanged at 1.2% for 2019,  and 1.4% and 
1.5% for 2020 and 2021. 
For our other scenarios, we take the impact point as 
Q4 2019, given the new scheduled departure date. 
The date any impacts may occur is still uncertain, 
however. Starting at Q4 is simply for illustrative 
purposes to show the range of outcomes. 
Whilst the risk of a ‘no-deal’ outcome has been 
pushed back, it remains a possibility. There is huge 
uncertainty over how this might look, the timing 
of when this might happen, and how the economy 
might respond. 
NB: These are annual growth rates. Each scenario has a contraction 
between Q4 2019 and the middle of 2020. From peak to trough these 
contractions are -1.3% for ‘attempted “managed” no deal’, -2.1% for ‘no 
deal policy response’, and -5.6% for ‘no deal no policy response’.
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Chart 52: FAI forecast Scottish economic growth range
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* Actual data to 2018. Central forecast with forecast uncertainty 
for 2019 – 2021. Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of 
past forecasts at different forecast horizons.
Table 9:  FAI central forecast Scottish GDP growth 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Production 1.2% 1.5% 1.4%
Construction 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%
Services 1.3% 1.5% 1.6%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 10: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate (%)1 75.3% 75.1% 74.7%
Unemployment Rate (%)2 3.7% 4.0% 4.2%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
1 Rate calculated as total employment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16-64. 2 Rate calculated 
as total unemployment divided by total of economically active 
population aged 16 and over.
 
What any policy response to a ‘no deal’ Brexit might 
look like is still very uncertain. It is likely to involve 
a significant monetary stimulus through a cut in 
interest rates and possibly further Quantitative 
Easing. 
A fiscal stimulus is also likely, with an uplift in 
spending – possibly on infrastructure – and, as in 
2008, a temporary reduction in certain tax rates to 
support domestic spending. 
Even then, and assuming a policy stimulus relatively 
comparable to that in 2008/2009, the economy 
is still likely to take a negative hit, but on a much 
smaller scale. 
Of course, should the policy stimulus be bigger or 
smaller, then the exact number would change. On 
any reasonable assumption however, the scale 
of the ‘hit’ to the economy is likely to be much 
less than some of the ‘worst’ case scenarios have 
suggested.  This is illustrated through the attempted 
“managed” no-deal scenario, where further policy 
initiatives e.g. in order to temporarily reduce the 
impact on trade could be put into place.
Of course, there is a ‘best’ case scenario, where the 
recent uncertainty is reduced and confidence returns 
to the economy. In such a situation, we are likely 
to see a significant spike in new investment and in 
wider spending in the economy. 
This could reflect for example, clarity on the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU, including a 
commitment to close economic ties in some form or 
another. 
In such an instance, we think that growth could 
surprise on the upside and be much closer to trend 
by 2020 and 2021.
Based on our central scenario, our latest nowcasts 
suggest that growth will be 0.30% in Q2 2019. 
However, given the high degree of stockpiling we 
have seen in Q1, it is likely that the actual growth in 
Q2 will be lower than this. 
Our central forecast scenario is driven by solid 
growth in production and services, and a forecast 
pick up in construction activity after zero growth in 
2018.
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Policy context
20 years of Devolution
It is 20 years since the devolved Scottish Parliament 
was established. 
In many ways, the Scottish economy has been 
greatly transformed over that period. 
What the next 20 years will hold is obviously 
uncertain. But with Brexit, the possibility of 
IndyRef2 and major structural shifts in our economy 
guaranteed, it is clearly going to be a period of 
further upheaval.  
Economic and fiscal performance over the 
past 20 years
The first eight years of the parliament, from 1999 to 
2007, were characterised by a strongly performing 
economy (in Scotland and the UK), and a growing 
Holyrood budget. 
But in 2008, the global financial crisis tipped 
Scotland into a sharp and damaging recession.
In the end, the scale of the downturn – at least in 
terms of output and jobs lost – turned out to be 
smaller than perhaps many had feared at the onset 
of the meltdown in the global financial system. 
Chart 53: Average GDP growth rates, Scotland, 1973 - 2018
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But what has been particularly challenging has been 
the fragility of the subsequent recovery – not just in 
Scotland but across advanced economies. 
On top of this, the oil price shock of 2015 had 
a particularly negative effect on Scotland by 
dampening growth just when confidence was 
returning. A year later, in June 2016, the EU 
Referendum ushered in a renewed period of 
uncertainty.  
Scotland’s long-term growth rate is now well below 
trend. Chart 53.
Real terms household income per head, after having 
grown strongly through the early 2000s, remains 
lower today than in 2007.
By the end of 2018, output per head was only 3% 
above its pre-crisis level – about 1/10 of the growth 
in previous ten years. Chart 54.
Chart 54: GDP per head, Scotland & UK, 1998 - 2018
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The one bright spot has been the labour market, 
with employment at near record levels. 
But unpicking the data reveals some concerns. 
Whilst participation rates have risen sharply, a 
combination of weak wage growth, cuts to in-work 
benefits and fewer hours worked means that for 
many households, employment is no longer the 
route into a secure economic future it once was. 
The number of people in an in-work poverty 
household has risen by over 100,000 since 1999. 
Nearly 2/3 of children now living in poverty in 
Scotland are in a household with at least one adult 
in work. 
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On the public finances, after a period of 
unprecedented growth in spending in the early years 
of devolution – with growth in resource budgets of 
almost 50% in real terms between 1999 and 2007 
– over a decade of consolidation (or ‘austerity’) has 
followed.
Since 2010-11, the Scottish Government’s resource 
budget has shrunk by 7% (in real terms). 
At the same time, this fiscal squeeze has taken 
place at a time of a growing population and rising 
demand for many public services, most notably 
health.
The cuts to ‘non-protected’ areas therefore have 
been particularly tough. There is little evidence that 
austerity will be over anytime soon for many parts of 
Scotland’s public sector. 
Throughout all of this, the Parliament has taken 
on significant new responsibilities. Most notable 
are the new powers around income tax and other 
devolved taxes, with major new powers over social 
security coming on stream over the next few years. 
The arrangements for funding the Scottish Budget 
are now much more complicated than before, with 
the relative performance of the Scottish economy 
now having a major bearing on the revenues 
available to the Scottish Government. 
How has the Scottish Economy and Labour 
Market changed?
A striking thing about the last 20 years has been the 
structural changes in our economy. 
Chart 55: Industry shares of the Scottish economy
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Many of these changes go unnoticed. But they 
highlight the consistently evolving nature of our 
economy to technology, global factors and policy 
priorities. 
The offshore economy continues to be an important 
part of the Scottish Economy, but less than it was. 
Chart 55.
Indeed there has been a more general trend in our 
energy mix. Renewables contributed just 16% to our 
total electricity consumption back in 2005; now they 
contribute 75%.
Over the period – and despite the financial crisis - 
business services and finance have grown to be an 
ever larger share of our economy. 
Government (and related sectors such as 
universities) has also grown in its share of Scottish 
economic output.  
But contrary to some perceptions however, job 
growth in Scotland has been largely driven by the 
private rather than the public sector. Whilst public 
sector employment has risen by around 16,000 
since 1999, private sector employment has risen by 
over 410,000. 
Going in the opposite direction from business 
services & finance and government (and related 
sectors) has been manufacturing. We see clearly 
the decline of Silicon Glen, with computers and 
electronic equipment alone declining from 3% of the 
economy in 1999 to only 0.5% in the latest year. 
 
Chart 56: Employment & unemployment, Scotland, 1999 - 2018
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This has had a number of implications, including 
helping to explain Scotland’s weaker productivity 
and export performance. 
The Scottish labour market has also gone through 
significant changes. Chart 56.
Much of this long-term improvement in Scotland’s 
employment, unemployment and inactivity rates has 
been as a result of a sustained and significant uplift 
in female labour market participation. Chart 57.
Chart 57: Employment rates by gender, Scotland, 1999 - 2018
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The employment rate for women was 64% in 1999, 
now it is 73%. 
Our labour market is also getting older – with a 40% 
increase in the number of people employed who are 
over 50 in the last 15 years.
It is also becoming more flexible in the way people 
access employment opportunities, with a rise in 
part-time work and self-employment. Whether or not 
all of this greater flexibility is a good thing remains 
unclear. 
With relatively weak growth in the wider economy, 
but a strongly performing labour market, this has 
had consequences for Scotland’s productivity 
performance. Chart 58.
Like many advanced economies, productivity growth 
has slowed markedly since the financial crisis and 
compared to the initial period of devolution. 
Scotland’s productivity remains some 20% below 
the best performing OECD countries (although 
this gap does narrow if different measurement 
techniques are used). 
Chart 58: Scottish labour productivity & trend, 2000 - 2018
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Scotland has however, ‘caught-up’ with the UK. Back 
in 1999, Scotland’s labour productivity was 91% of 
the UK’s. In 2017 it was 97%. Chart 59.
Chart 59: Scottish  vs. UK labour productivity, 1998 - 2017
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Again, unpicking this reveals some interesting 
trends that unfortunately increasingly get ignored. 
In particular, Scotland’s relative improvement 
in productivity vis-à-vis the UK as a whole can 
largely be explained by changes in hours worked 
rather than a sustained uplift in relative economic 
efficiency. 
As a result, people in Scotland might be relatively 
‘more productive’ but this has been eroded by other 
means, including weaker growth in working hours. 
This is somewhat reflected in the weakening of 
Scotland’s relative position on Gross Disposable 
Household Income compared to the UK since 2010. 
Chart 60.
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People in Scotland may be more productive but 
wider labour market outcomes squeeze their 
prosperity.
Chart 60: Gross Disposable Household Income, Scotland (UK = 
100), 1999 - 2016
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A key driver of the growth in the number of people 
in work in Scotland has been the turnaround in 
Scotland’s population. 
The population of Scotland has increased 
significantly since the turn of the century, reversing 
the decline since the 1970s to be at the highest 
level ever. Chart 61.
Chart 61: Population in Scotland, 1958 - 2018
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Figure 1: Estimated population of Scotland, mid-1958 to mid-2018
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This increase has been driven by migration, both 
from the EU Accession countries and the rest of the 
UK. In general, natural change (i.e. births minus 
deaths) is negative, and therefore any population 
growth comes from migration.
So how much has devolution changed 
Scotland’s economic fortunes?
Answering such a question easily is clearly fraught 
with difficulties, given the lack of a counterfactual 
and the significant wider structural change that has 
taken place over this time. 
Scotland continues to remain the wealthiest part 
of the UK outside of London and has had notable 
successes in areas such as renewable energy and 
attracting international investment. 
On a number of key macroeconomic indicators, 
Scotland has improved its relative position within 
the UK – both in terms of comparisons to the UK as a 
whole and to the other devolved nations and English 
regions. This includes on productivity and most 
labour market measures. Table 11.
Economic policy has departed from the rest of the 
UK in a number of areas, most notably in higher 
education, the retention of Scotland’s enterprise 
agencies and – in recent times – on tax. 
But in many other areas, the economic challenges 
that Scotland faced 20 years ago remain today.
Overall, aspects of our private sector economy 
appear to be less dynamic than elsewhere. 
Our export base is smaller than that of our 
competitors. On business R&D, almost 40% of such 
expenditure is attributable to just five companies 
with Scotland ranking 9th out of the 12 devolved 
nations and English regions of the UK. 
On new business start-ups, Scotland ranks 10th, 
and also lags behind the UK average in terms of 
levels of entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Inequality remains a huge challenge.  
For all the efforts on ‘inclusive growth’, nearly 1 
million people – including nearly 1 in 4 children - 
live in relative poverty.
UK Social Security changes over the past decade 
have changed the make-up of households in poverty 
significantly, with the burden of poverty falling less 
on pensioners and more on working age households 
and those with children. Chart 62. 
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Table 11:  Economic indicators, 1999 - today
Indicator Value in 
1999
Performance 
relative to 
UK
Rank (12 UK 
countries/
regions) in 
1999
Most recent 
value
Most recent 
performance 
relative to 
UK
Current 
rank (12 UK 
countries/
regions)
GVA per head £13,865 90% 4th £25,485 92% 3rd
Productivity (output per hour worked) N/A 91% 7th N/A 97% 3rd
Employment rate (16-64) 69% -2.6 p.p 8th 76% -0.2 p.p 5th
Unemployment rate (16+) 7% +1.1 p.p 9th (lowest) 3% -0.5 p.p 5th (lowest)
Inactivity rate (16-64) 25% +1.9 p.p 8th (lowest) 22% +0.7 p.p 6th (lowest)
GDHI £10,400 90% 9th £18,100 93% 5th
Full-time gross median weekly pay £330 95% 5th £565 99% 4th
Source: ONS
Chart 62: Percentage of households in relative poverty (after 
housing costs)
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Scotland’s health inequalities continue to act as 
a significant drag on long-term growth potential. 
In 2017, the premature mortality rate in the most 
deprived areas was 4 times higher than the rate in 
the least deprived areas.
Our economy also remains unbalanced 
geographically. The 16-64 employment rate is 
greater than 80% in Aberdeenshire, but as low as 
64% in Glasgow. 
Future economic and fiscal challenges
What is the next 20 years likely to hold?
Of course, the immediate change on the horizon is 
Brexit. And for policymakers at Holyrood this will 
mean not only dealing with the implications for 
the economy and society, but handling potentially 
significant legislative and fiscal changes.
In the relatively short-term, there will also be a 
number of issues to resolve in relation to the way in 
which the Scottish Budget is funded. 
We have seen in recent weeks the potential 
serious implications for the Scottish Budget from 
tax ‘reconciliations’ (the reckoning between tax 
forecasts that were made when budgets were set 
with the outturn data) that underpin the new Fiscal 
Framework. 
A decision will also be required on whether current 
plans to assign VAT revenues should go ahead given 
the significant uncertainties in the estimation of 
these revenues and the consequent budgetary risks.
These issues will lie at the heart of the renegotiation 
of the Fiscal Framework in 2021. 
Beyond these relatively concrete issues, the 
parliament is likely to face a range of wider 
economic challenges, some of which we can be 
relatively certain about and others over which there 
is more uncertainty.
The fallout from the ‘Great Recession’ and fiscal 
austerity have illustrated that – in many key areas 
– the major macroeconomic and fiscal policy levers 
remain at Westminster. But many of Scotland’s long-
term challenges lie within devolved powers. 
We highlight three here – demographic change; 
climate change; inequalities and well-being.
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The major ‘known’ long-term economic shift over 
the next 20 years which will have a profound effect 
both on the Scottish economy and public finances 
is demographic change, colloquially referred to as 
‘population ageing’. Chart 63.
The number of people aged over 75 is expected to 
increase by 79% over the next 25 years. 
Chart 63: Population projections, Scotland, total & working age, 
2016 - 2041
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
20
31
20
32
20
33
20
34
20
35
20
36
20
37
20
38
20
39
20
40
20
41
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
(2
01
6=
10
0)
16-64 Population Total Population
Source: Nationals Records of Scotland
This process of population ageing will continue to 
have profound implications for Scotland’s economy 
and public finances. 
Scottish Government spending on health has risen 
from 37% of day-to-day devolved spending in 
1999/00 to 48% in 2019/20. Spending on social 
care for older aged adults is similarly absorbing 
a larger and larger share of local government 
spending. 
Keeping up with such demand pressures, whilst 
trying to tackle Scotland’s stubbornly high levels of 
health inequalities, will not be easy. 
A key policy challenge will, of course, be climate 
change. 
Scotland should be well placed to take advantage 
of a concentration of industries that can support the 
transition to a low carbon economy.  But the scale of 
the transformation required – and the trade-offs that 
may be required in the short-term - will not be easy 
to manage. Many of the decisions required will be 
politically unpopular. Current patterns of economic 
activity are likely to require significant disruption. 
Chart 64: Greenhouse Gas emissions in Scotland, 1997 - 2017
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Tackling Scotland’s unequal economy arguably 
remains the biggest challenge. 
Whilst significant policy shifts have been made in 
many areas, Scotland remains a highly unequal 
society.
Some of this reflects the long-term nature of many 
of the interventions that we know will make a 
difference (e.g. in education). 
But there is also a question about how bold and 
truly transformational the proposals being put 
forward are – by all political parties – particularly if 
Scotland is to meet its objectives in areas such as 
reducing child poverty. 
For example, despite it being nearly five years since 
the Scottish Government launched ‘inclusive growth’ 
as its key policy agenda, the Poverty and Inequality 
Commission have raised concerns that the Scottish 
Government has not been sufficiently clear about 
what it means by inclusive growth, concluding 
that “inclusive growth appears to be more of a 
concept than something which results in a tangible 
outcome”.
Other economic trends are associated with more 
uncertainty. 
Will Scotland be more or less impacted by Brexit 
than the rest of the UK? How will Scotland’s 
economy cope with the long-term decline in the 
North Sea? And what are the risks and opportunities 
for Scotland’s economy from the 4th industrial 
revolution and the rise of the digital economy?
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Conclusion
In the 20 years since the Scottish Parliament was 
established, the Scottish economy and labour 
market has changed greatly. However, many of the 
challenges remain the same. 
The Parliament has been responsible for notable 
and bold social policy initiatives, like the smoking 
ban and minimum unit pricing. It is possible to argue 
that in the area of economic policy, there has been a 
more timid approach. 
The next 20 years are likely to see economic change 
at least as significant as the past 20 years, as well as 
further change to the constitutional settlement. 
If Scotland is to meet the challenges of the next 
decade and beyond – and take advantage of the 
undoubted opportunities that will arise – it is likely 
to require a much bolder economic policy agenda. 
Fraser of Allander Institute
June 2019
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Sign up details will be available closer to the 
time of the event.
Scotland’s Budget 2019
Tuesday 12th November
We are delighted to announce the Fraser of Allander’s 4th Scotland’s Budget event will take place on 
Thursday 12th November in the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh.
This annual briefing event analyses the state of the economy, the public finances and the options 
open to the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Economy and Fair Work as the Scottish Govern-
ment prepares for its Budget later in the year.
Alongside the event, we’ll be publishing our annual report of Scotland’s devolved public finances 
and the choices, opportunities and risks facing the Scottish Government as it prepares to set its 
Budget for 2020/21.
We’re delighted that Paul Johnson – Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies – will once again be 
joining us to provide his take on the outlook for the UK public finances.  
Keynote speakers include:
     ■  Paul Johnson, Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies
     ■  Graeme Roy, Director, Fraser of Allander Institute
     ■  David Eiser, Head of Fiscal & Budget Analysis, Fraser of Allander 
       Institute
     ■  Mairi Spowage, Head of Economic Analysis, Fraser of Allander 
       Institute
Date: Tuesday 12th November
Time: 9am-11.30am (registration & refreshments from 8am)
Fraser of Allander Institute 
University of Strathclyde 
199 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0QU    
Scotland, UK 
Telephone: 0141 548 3958 
Email: fraser@strath.ac.uk
Website: www.strath.ac.uk/fraser
Follow us on Twitter via @Strath_FAI
